23.05.2005 

Part II: The Intelligence of Socialist Poland - 1944-1989

The Forming of the Organizational Structure

The restoration of Polish independence after the war was accompanied by a reconstruction of its national intelligence services. However this process proceeded under Soviet patronage. The majority of pre-war and a wartime professionals were subjected to repressions by the new Polish authorities, or remained in the West. In 1944, one year prior to the end of the war, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzvolenia Narodowego) was created in Moscow. Within its framework a special Department of Public Security (Resort Bezpieczenstwa Publizcnego) operated. In 1945, after the liberation of Poland from the Germans, this department became the basis for creation of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publizcnego - MBP). The Administrative Department of Security (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa - UB) was a part of the structure of the new ministry, dealing with both intelligence and counterespionage activities. In parallel, within the ranks of the Polish army the Military Intelligence Services for Intelligence and Counterespionage (Wojskowe Sluzby Wewnetrzne - WSW) operated. It is necessary to note, that, from the moment of UB`s creation until the end of the Communist period in the history of Poland, (1989) the civil intelligence service took a leading position in Polish intelligence, rather than the military, as it had been before war. At the first stage of its existence, officers of the Soviet Secret services from People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (the notorious NKVD) were used as professional instructors for its personnel. Concurrently with the reorganization of the Soviet special services and creation of the infamous KGB in 1954 a similar structure was created in Poland. It was named, Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpiecztnstwa Publicznego). The structure of UB was placed under its authority. However, two years later, following the instability in the country’s state security services community, including intelligence and counterespionage, it was again centralized. The Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych - MSW) headed all bodies. Accordingly, the name of Administrative Department of Security (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa - UB) was changed and, till the collapse of the Communist regime, it was called simply, Security Service (Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa - SB).

Operative Successes and Defeats

 SB`s functions were the same as its predecessor's – intelligence and counterespionage. Inside the "family" of the secret services of the former Socialist camp, this Polish special service has quickly acquired a reputation for a high level of professionalism. Up to the end of its existence, SB was considered one of the best intelligence services in East Europe. The area of its activity was extremely wide and included Western Europe, the USA, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Among the professional successes of SB it is necessary to note, first of all, creation of its intelligence network inside the NATO headquarters in Paris during the second half of the fifties. It also succeeded in acquiring information on American missile technologies (1979-1983), on various American military radar systems, and on anti-aircraft defense systems (1979-1981). The information on radar tracking systems was given by William H. Bell, project manager of the Radar Systems Group at Hughes Aircraft in El Segundo, California. Polish intelligence carried out activities with Bell throuigh its officer, Marian Zacharski, who was working undercover in the USA as the president of the Polish American Machinery Corporation (POLAMCO). Another of SB’s big operative successes was the liquidation of the Polish base of the Ukrainian nationalist underground (OUN/UPA) at the end of the Forties and the beginning of the Fifties, and also above-mentioned suppression of ?? activity. There also were many professional failures. For example, up to the end of its days, SB could not stop vigorous CIA activity in support of Polish anti-Communist opposition. Several cases of the defection of SB employees to the West also constituted a serious problem The best known are those of colonel Michal Goleniewski to the USA in 1958 and of his colleague Wladyslaw Mroz to France in 1959. Both of them harmed Polish intelligence enormously by revealing the identities of a number of important agents in the USA, Western Europe and Israel.

Problems in Mutual Relations with Moscow

In contrast to the commonly accepted opinion in the West about the solidity of the relations between special services bodies within the Socialist camp, mutual relations of Polish SB and its "senior partner," the KGB actually were not that simple. The conflict between both structures began long before the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. It unraveled along with the general complications in mutual relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. KGB`s official representative in Warsaw, General Pavlov accused his Polish colleagues of pursuing of their narrow interests to the detriment of the interests of the Socialist bloc as a whole. The Soviet general treated in an especially negative way the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Poland, Wladislaw Pozoga. Since 1980 Pozoga had supervised the intelligence and counterespionage activities of SB. Pavlov accused Pozoga of nationalism, and also of an attempt to steal the KGB`s technology for devices used in field work. The Poles, on their side, accused their Soviet colleagues of unwillingness to render real assistance. They said that cooperation by of KGB was limited to the solving of minor technical questions, while Moscow demanded from Warsaw the transfer of all valuable intelligence data acquired in the West. The conflict between the KGB and the SB reached its apogee at the beginning of the Eighties. First, Poles replaced keys in encrypting machines of Soviet manufacture, preventing KGB from listening to Polish communication lines. Secondly, the KGB seized an automobile belonging to the Polish embassy, which was parked near a secret defensive enterprise in Moscow. Officers of the Polish intelligence were inside taping signals coming from communication system of this enterprise. The leadership of both states hushed up the scandal. However the Soviet embassy in Warsaw had to replace its encrypting equipment because of concern that it might be wired by Polish "colleagues." This happened less than ten years before the final breaking off of relations between the two secret services.

Read about the transformations of the Polish intelligence at the post-Communist period (1989-2005) in the next part of this article.