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The leaders of China and Russia
Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin |
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Main dividends from the bankruptcy of the West’s Central Asian policy are being shared by the Russians and the Chinese. Contrary to other parties of "anti-Western front", Beijing and Moscow were tenaciously striving to push the Americans out of the region. For this purpose they, among other means, used their influence over Tashkent and Bishkek, in the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Both Russia and China to the same extent benefited from the change of external powers in the region in 2005. However, in a long-term prospective, Beijing has a real chance of monopolizing economic and political influence in Central Asia…
Compulsory Expansion
China had begun taking interest in Central Asia as early as the second century B.C. Since then, aims of the Chinese policy in this region have not crucially changed. They were initially directed at preventing Central Asia from turning into a bridgehead for the rivals of the Han
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The first Chinese expedition to the "Western Region", a medieval Chinese engraving |
Empire, and also at providing via the Central Asian countries of a steady trade between China on the one hand, and Europe and the Middle East on the other. It was these aims that defined the nature of the Chinese expansion in western direction.
Best defense is offense
Almost from its very beginning, the Han civilization was under threat of everlasting attacks of the militant nomadic tribes. The latter were part of the nomadic world, stretching from modern Korea and Mongolia in the East, to Iran, Turkey, and Russia in the West. Permanent conflict with the nomads made the self-contained Chinese conduct international policy directed first of all toward proceeding deeper into the Asian continent. Main object for this expansion was Xiyu - "Western Region" (which is now known as East Turkestan or Xinjiang) – the eastern extremity of the Iranian civilization of Central Asia. The Chinese fortresses and army camps emerged in small oasitic towns of this district. From that period on, the eastern periphery of the "Western Region" turned into a bridgehead for China’s expansion to the West. The Han troops first intruded Central Asia in the II century B.C. Although they had not obtained any great gains, China had decisively demonstrated its bid for becoming a regional power.
Contrary to other traditional parties in the struggle for influence in Central Asia, China never claimed to be a ruler of mind and soul of the local population. Iranian and Turkic peoples were hardly susceptible to the rich, but absolutely alien Chinese culture. Its influence expanded only among the nomads, who had been living near the Chinese, interacting with them. Until the second half of the XX century, the Chinese cultural influence in the "Western Region" could be felt only among the urban population of its eastern periphery, and in its few Han colonies. Accordingly, main instruments of the Chinese regional expansion were diplomacy and intelligence, and less often – the army.
Western border
Although, in the periods of China’s might, its rulers declared all the territories up to Eastern Iran as zone of their interests, in reality till the second
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| The map of the East Turkestan |
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half of the XX century they did not even manage to completely conquer the "Western Region". Until the 1830s, the Chinese advance to the West was hindered by ancestors of the modern Turkic peoples of Central Asia. The situation, which was then created, did not undergo any crucial changes till the 1990s. China was in decline, and for all of this time it was occupied by its internal problems. Central Asia resigned itself to the Russians, joining the Russian Empire, and later on – the Soviet Union. The Russians did not try to conquer the "Western Region", while the Chinese did not interfere in affairs of the peoples living outside it. This status quo existed till the collapse of the USSR, and emergence of five Central Asian States to the West of the Chinese borders.
Dangerous changes
In 1991, Central Asia once again turned into a source of regional instability and geopolitical threats for China.
Firstly, following the Russians’ withdrawal, there appeared an empty space, attractive to those external forces, which China considered dangerous. Turkish activity in Central Asia carried the threat of pan-Turkism oriented not only toward the Central Asian, but also toward the East Turkestani Turki. Arab and Iranian influence in the region was based upon the export of different forms of Islamic fundamentalism, including to Xinjiang. Arrival of the Americans foreboded creation in Central Asia of a strategic bridgehead, which further on could be used against China.
Secondly, at the end of the 1980s – beginning of the 1990s, the Central Asian areas bordering China, especially Ferghana Valley and Tajikistan, turned into an epicenter of interethnic conflicts and a breading-ground for Islamic fundamentalism. And what is most important: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became the rear area of the East Turkestani separatist movement. All this was a real threat to political stability and security of Western China.
Thirdly, Soviet heritage to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan was the unsettled issue of the Chinese border. Although this problem was not a direct threat for China, if observed in overall manner it was yet another factor inimical to regional stability.
West’s appeasement
During the 1990s, China did not show any intention to continue its expansion in western direction. First of all, China tried, without spending much effort and resources, to neutralize the threats to its own security, coming from the West. Its natural ally in doing so was Russia. Beijing was interested in partial restoration of Moscow’s positions in Central Asia. On the one hand, the Russians did not already have any chance to return the control over this region, and this fact gave the Chinese a broad possibility for the future maneuver. On the other hand, enforcement of the Russians allowed weakening of Central Asian positions of the other external forces, much more dangerous for China.
The Russian-Chinese alliance, based upon the communion of regional interests, was formed in 1996-97, in the framework of the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan).
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The logo of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) |
In summer 2001, this organization was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (after the joining of Uzbekistan). This new alliance allowed resolving of the border problem. Besides that, in the framework of this club Beijing could exercise pressure over the Central Asian leaders more easily, in order to suppress regional activity of the separatists from East Turkestan.
Russia’s gradual activation favored weakening of the other external players’ positions. Although they did gain certain influence, they did not manage to occupy a key place in Central Asian politics. Simultaneously, with Moscow’s participation, the Tajik war was terminated along the Chinese border. Earlier, the bloody interethnic clashes in Ferghana Valley were stopped. Only the radical Islam in Central Asia and Afghanistan continued to constitute a threat for East Turkestan. The Chinese and the Russians, however, believed that even in case this problem was not solved, it could be at least kept under control by joint efforts.
At the beginning of the XXI century, Beijing could effectively consider that the task on appeasement of its Western neighbors was accomplished. The situation in Central Asia now aroused a much lesser concern of the Chinese leadership than a decade before. But then, with all of the sudden, the explosions thundered in New York and Washington. Only few weeks later, first groups of the American Intelligence and Commandos officers appeared in Northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan…
Menace from the West
Emergence of the American military bases in Uzbekistan, and especially in Kyrgyzstan, which shares border with China, demonstrated the bankruptcy of Beijing’s Central Asian policy. Taking decision to locate the US military forces, Bishkek and Tashkent did not give any notice to their Chinese partners from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Majority of the Chinese experts and top officials did not doubt that the American bases in Central Asia do constitute a threat to national security. In their opinion, the USA traditionally aspired to weaken China, including by exploiting the national minorities. In its regional politics America was viewed by China as a successor of British Empire. The latter, competing with Russia for control over Central Asia, in the XIX century on a number of occasions staked on the East Turkestani separatism. In the 1880s, the British almost openly supported the State of Yettishar, which emerged in East Turkestan. Their bridgehead in doing so was the
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| The flag of the separatist movement of the Eastern Turkestan |
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north-western extremity of British India, which borders the Chinese Xinjiang like Kyrgyzstan does in the North.
In 1945, the USA definitively chose the side of the Chinese Communists’ opponents. Consequences of this decision are sensed in bilateral relations till now. American intelligence turned to be one of the sworn enemies of the secret services of People’s Republic of China. However, only in August 1998, the CIA was for the first time publicly accused of having connections with the East Turkestani separatists. Therefore, the dislocation of the US military bases in Central Asia was viewed by Beijing also as creation of a bridgehead for propagandist and sabotage activity in Xinjiang. Furthermore, Beijing was sure that the US military presence in Central Asia is part of a global doctrine aimed at “containment” of China (other important elements of this doctrine: strengthening of military cooperation with Taiwan, activation of partnership with Japan, support of Japan’s military and regional ambitions).
New strategy
Autumn 2001 events forced China to review totally the concept of its Central Asian policy. Beijing passed from passive “appeasement” of the regional neighbors to active creation of a broad “security zone” on its Western frontiers. This aim can be attained by means of political and economic expansion in Central Asia. In the basis of this new policy lies the aspiration to make the local elites interested in strengthening of relations with China, to offer them considerable material and political dividends. The accent is being made on offering grants, long-term loans, and investments in strategic spheres of economy. This allows quite rapid demonstration of result from the Chinese economic activity, and, consequently, endearing of the local authorities and population. In the meantime, Beijing is gradually establishing control over strategic spheres of economy (energy, communications, communication technologies, etc.)
The Uzbek card
Beginning its activation in Central Asia, China paid a special attention to Uzbekistan. This republic was given
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| The leaders of Uzbekistan and China Islam Karimov and Hu Jintao |
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almost a key role in the regional strategy of guaranteeing the Chinese national interests. Such approach is dictated by a number of reasons.
Geopolitical factor: In spite of the fact that Uzbekistan does not share border with China, these states are separated by a narrow strip of the Kyrgyz territory, populated mostly by the Uzbeks. It was this fact that provoked Beijing’s concern, when the Pentagon base appeared in Uzbekistan. All the more so, as in March 2002, Tashkent concluded a military-strategic alliance with Washington, and according to the initial agreements the Uzbek base was constructed for at least 25 years (while the dislocation of the US base in neighboring Kyrgyzstan was initially conditioned to normalization in Afghanistan). In such a way, Uzbekistan was turning into a long-term US bridgehead, in immediate proximity from the Chinese Xinjiang.
Their presence in this Central Asian republic allowed the Americans to create here a powerful centre of radio-electronic intelligence, oriented toward China. Moreover, theoretically speaking, the US base could be used against People’s Republic of China. And what seemed more probable, Washington could use its influence in Tashkent to block the shortest trade way from China to the Middle East (Xinjiang – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan - Turkmenistan - Iran – the Arab countries). Same way, the Americans could also slow down the speed of the Chinese economic expansion in Turkmenistan.
Regional factor: Either Uzbekistan, which is too strong, or Uzbekistan, which is too weak – both may constitute a threat for China’s strategic interests.
The Uzbeks are not only the titular nation of Uzbekistan, but also the biggest minorities in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. They constitute a majority among the Turkic population of Central Asia and Afghanistan. There is also the Uzbek community in Xinjiang. The Uighurs, the closest people to the Uzbeks among the peoples of Central Asia, constitute the majority among the non-Chinese ethnoses of East Turkestan, and almost a half of its total population.
Demographic data testify that the Uzbek Nation in future prospective has a chance to create a strong Turkic power on a scale of the whole region. It would be a backstop on the way of the Chinese expansion in western direction. All the more so, because it is this very role that the ancestors of the modern Uzbeks played during almost two millenniums. Furthermore, emergence of such a power can provoke a new outburst of Uighur separatism in Western China. It is also possible that a powerful Uzbek State would veiledly render assistance to the kin Uighurs. In the XVIII – XIX centuries, the Central Asian Turki often supported the anti-Chinese actions of the Uighurs. And one of the Uzbek states successfully contended China over control in East Turkestan.
At the same time, weakening of central power and political destabilization in Uzbekistan are also disadvantageous to Beijing. One, as well as the other can provoke activation of the radical Islam, and interethnic conflicts, not only in Uzbekistan, but also in Southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Such scenario would inevitably affect the situation in Xinjiang.
Economic factor: The population of Uzbekistan has reached 26 million, and makes up almost half of the inhabitants of all Central Asia. Accordingly, it is the biggest and the most lucrative market for the Chinese production in the entire region. Moreover, Uzbekistan is a link between China and the eastern part of Central Asia from one side, and Turkmenistan and Iran from another. Accordingly, this republic could be a key in the system of economic relations of Beijing with the Middle East, and in projects of oil and gas transportation from Iran and Turkmenistan to China, and further to the Far East and to Southeast Asia.
“Steal any passing goat”
Taking into account the value of Uzbekistan in the Central Asian strategy of Beijing, it is possible to understand, to what extent the Chinese were interested in breaking up the union of Tashkent and Washington. Therefore the efforts of some officials of the State Department, the pro-Arab lobby in the USA, and the representatives of Saudi Arabia's establishment fully complied with the strategic interests of China. Without undertaking special efforts, the latter has managed to take advantage of the rivalry between the American diplomats and the military, and of the fruits of the backstage diligence of the Arab sheikhs. In the language of smart Chinese stratagems it is called: "Steal any passing goat".
In June 2004, the USA reduced financial aid to Uzbekistan by $18 million. For the first time in the history of mutual relations it was officially declared that such a step was undertaken on political grounds ("infringements of human rights and absence of progress in democratization.")
That same month the Chinese leader, Hu Jintao, visited Tashkent for the first time. On the eve of the visit the ambassador of China in Uzbekistan declared in the interview to the local governmental newspaper that development of mutual relations was one of the main priorities of all the foreign policy of Beijing. Following the meeting of the heads of the two states, China rendered to Uzbekistan $350 million worth of free aid, interest-free, with preferential and export credits. Moreover, the Uzbek army received as a gift from the Chinese $1.5 million worth of military equipment, and the Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs got $180 thousand worth of equipment. To this it is necessary to add, that starting in 2004 the volume of commodity circulation between China and Uzbekistan has jumped up almost by 70%.
In 2005, the leaders of Uzbekistan and China met twice. In May, the Uzbek President visited
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| Hu Jintao meets Islam Karimov |
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Beijing for the fourth time since the moment of establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in 1992. In July, the meeting of the heads of the two states took place in the Kazakh capital. In October, negotiations between the Chinese Prime Minister and the Uzbek vice-Premier took place in Moscow. Among the Chinese officials, who visited Tashkent in 2005, were the Vice Premier (July) and the Deputy Chairman of the Parliament (November). Among the Uzbek officials, who came to Beijing, besides the President, two weeks prior to his arrival, was the First Vice Premier, and three months later - the Deputy Minister of Defense. In December, the new head of the Defense Ministry of the republic came to China. Previously, in June, being the Secretary of the National Security Council, he already met with the Chinese Minister of Public Security, who came to the Kazakh capital.
In May 2005, Uzbekistan and China signed "An Agreement on partnership relations of friendship and cooperation". It is, according to the Uzbek President: "a strong base for development of a new strategic partnership between two countries". This document ranks with the agreements on "strategic partnership" and "allied relations" between Russia and Uzbekistan, signed accordingly in June 2004 and November 2005. These three agreements together, not only "compensate", but greatly exceed by its value the agreement on strategic partnership signed between Uzbekistan and the USA in March 2002, and actually terminated by the American side in the spring of 2005.
In the sphere of economy, in 2005 China was showing even more attention to Uzbekistan than in the year before. During Karimov's visit to Beijing alone, the sides concluded more than 20 investment agreements, credit contracts and deals totaling about $1.5 billion. The Chinese have shown a special interest in the strategic spheres of the Uzbek economy: prospecting and pumping of oil and gas ($600 million of investments), the cotton industry, communications, infrastructure of communications, and information technologies. In July, with the participation of the Chinese Vice Premier, a bilateral business forum took place in Tashkent. Eight economic contracts, for a total sum of $47.3 million were signed there.
Additionally, throughout the year 2005, the sides several times discussed an issue of the construction of a highway Kashgar (Western China) – Irkeshtam (Chinese-Kyrgyz border) – Osh (Southern Kyrgyzstan) – Andijan (Eastern Uzbekistan). This project is of high strategic value, as the planned highway will at once connect China with two republics of Central Asia. Moreover, it becomes part of the shortest way from China to Iran and further to the Middle East. According to the Uzbek Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Sobirzhan Khasanov: "With the construction of this road, forecasts show that commodity circulation between our countries can increase by 30-40%". At the same time, according to the Uzbek Minister of Finance Rustam Azimov, in the near future the trade turnover between the two countries will reach $2 billion annually. In that case, China will take second place after Russia in this category.
The army on call
Taking into account the geopolitical situation in Central Asia, and also its own interests in the region, in Uzbekistan and Xinjiang, Beijing, even faster than Moscow, unconditionally rendered its support to Tashkent in connection with the unrests in May in the eastern region of the republic. The Chinese side considered the Andijan riots a threat to its own interests for three reasons at least. First, any actions directed to overthrowing the ruling regime in Uzbekistan, could end up with the coming to power of forces hostile towards Beijing. Second, destabilization in Ferghana valley, could affect the situation in Xinjiang. Third, Andijan is a terminal point of the strategic highway between China and the countries of the region. At the same time, having instantly supported Tashkent, and not only by words, Beijing effectively managed to take advantage of the events of May for its own ends. The Chinese have considerably strengthened connections with the Uzbeks, in particular in the key spheres of economy, thus "tying" them much more strongly. Simultaneously, using bilateral channels and influence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
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Kadyr Gulyamov (left)
and Islam Karimov |
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Beijing forced the Americans to leave Uzbekistan, and thus weakened their regional positions.
Moreover, at the end of May the Chinese clearly implied that in the event of a repeat in the destabilization in Central Asia, their armies could appear there. The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China voiced the statement. In the modern history of this state, it still had never sent the army to other countries. In Central Asia the Chinese armies appeared for the last time at the beginning of XIX century.
The change in the Uzbekistan's foreign policy guide lines in 2005 was brightly shown by the recent replacement of the Head of the Defense Ministry of the republic. Since September 2000, Kadyr Gulyamov had occupied this post. One and a half months after his assignment, he left for the USA on a first official visit as a Minister. In Washington, Gulyamov signed an agreement on further cooperation in the military and military-industrial areas. This document underlined the allied agreement signed between the two countries in the spring of 2002. The first trip of the Minister of Defense abroad predetermined the department's foreign policy during the greater part of Gulyamov's stay in the office. The peak of the military cooperation of Uzbekistan with the USA came during the period of his work at this post. However, owing to the worsening of mutual relations in the spring - summer of 2005, the American military left the territory of the republic. This took place on November 21, just one week prior to the new head of Defense Department, the Chinese native, Ruslan Mirzayev, taking over the office. In two weeks, his first foreign trip as a Minister started, when he left for... his native country!
Part II of this article
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