Burglars' attacks on ambassadors of the CIS and the East European countries in Israel became rather frequent in August. For the moment, the AIA may reveal only the details of one of the cases that occurred during the last month. In the beginning of August, a group of
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Krinka
Vidakovic Petrov |
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unidentified persons attacked the residence of the ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Nedegeljko Masleca. At that moment there was nobody in the building. About one year ago a robber intruded the residence of the head of the embassy of Serbia - Montenegro, Ms. Krinka Vidakovic Petrov at night. She was at home at thay time,
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Embassy of Belarus in Israel |
and, having noticed the criminal, she tried to resist him. The malefactor retired, but almost at once tried to penetrate the residence again, by another way. Earlier, a burglar also attacked the residence of the ambassador of Belarus, Mr. Gennady Lavitsky.
All the ambassadorial residences are located in the same area - Herzliya Pituah, which is considered to be one of the most luxurious areas in the country. According to the diplomatic sources, despite of repeating appeals the authorities flatly refuse to grant protection to the embassies and ambassadors from the CIS and the East European states, at least for a few hours per day. Moreover, the police does not apply almost any efforts to investigate the incidents, and to return the stolen property to the diplomats. Appeals to the representatives of the highest ranks of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs also do no good. As a rule, in such cases they resort to the standard answer: we are not capable to influence the police or, especially, the SHABAK (Israel's General Security Service).
It is natural that such a scornful attitude causes indignation in diplomats from the CIS and the East European countries. As they use to say, if the embassies are not at all protected from the attacks of the gangsters, what may happen in case of a terrorist attack? And the AIA sources have no doubt in existence of such a threat.
The Target for Terrorists
First of all, embassies of the countries of East Europe, whose armies participate in the Iraqi campaign, as, for example Poland,
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| Embassy of Kazakhstan in Israel |
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Bulgaria, and Ukraine, are on a potential target list for the terrorists' attacks. Also the acts of terrorism can be directed against the diplomatic missions of the two states of Central Asia having their representatives in Tel Aviv – namely Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Starting from 2004, the authorities of the Kazakh republic are acting very efficiently against local cells of the international Islamic organizations. This naturally causes growing discontent among the supporters and foreign patrons of these cells. In his turn the Uzbek President Islam Karimov is already for a long time considered to be the sworn enemy of the radical Islamic movement in all Central Asia. For these reasons the embassies and the diplomats of the both countries can become a target for a terrorist act. Especially inside Israel, but also on the West bank of Jordan River, and particularly in the East Jerusalem, the clandestine cells of such extremist organizations as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al Takfir Wal Hijra, As-Salafiyun, Tabligh Wa Al Dawa are operating. They are a part of the Middle-Eastern network of international structures with the same name, which are connected to Al-Qaeda. It is also known that activists of these organizations in Israel and Palestine have connections with their adherents in the CIS countries. Video, audio, and printed materials in Russian and Uzbek languages that were found during the last years in the Islamic educational centers and mosques of East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Nablus constitute a solid proof to this connection. They contained propagation of Sacred War (Jihad) in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia. Moreover, since 1999, the members of such organizations as Hizb ut-Tahrir, HAMAS, and Al-Jihad (the Palestinian infrastructure) prepared or participated in attacks on official representatives and embassies of Turkey, Vatican, Egypt, the USA and France. All this confirms that the fears concerning a possibility of acts of terrorism against diplomatic missions and ambassadors of the East European and the CIS countries in Israel are real.
The Best Protection
Demanding from the Israeli authorities to arrange on maintenance of their security, the East European diplomats appeal to a principle of reciprocity - one of the basics of the international diplomatic practice. They note that in their countries the embassies of Israel are protected as good as the local major governmental and military facilities, and sometimes even better. It includes various protecting constructions, and also means of monitoring and warning systems. Almost in all of the countries of CIS and the East Europe employees of the Israeli security service can carry their weapons constantly not only within the premises of the embassy, but also beyond its limits. Not so many other diplomatic missions enjoy such permissions, except for Israelis maybe only Americans. Moreover, in a number of the countries the local authorities provide additional protection for the embassies of Israel – the officers of local security bodies. As a rule, they form an external ring of protection of diplomatic mission and in case of attack should be the first to engage and first to suffer from the main attack of the terrorists. That is what happened in July 2004, when, as a result of an attack of the suicide terrorist on the Israeli embassy in Tashkent, the only victims were two employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan.
Intrigues of the Secret Services
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| Yuval Diskin, Head of Israeli General Security Service (SHABAK) |
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Israeli officials explain the absence of protection of the embassies of the CIS and the East European countries by a lack of financing. However, some our sources are convinced that Israeli authorities will never admit the true reasons of this problem. In their opinion, the only explanation that can be given to the fact of frequent robberies of ambassadorial residences, and a total inactivity of police, is the explanation that the secret services are behind the burglars' strikes.
The press-service of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sounded an unprecedented criticism in address of the Israel's General Security Service in January 2004. The Israeli counterespionage service was accused of illegal intrusion into the embassy and the residence of the ambassador of Norway in Tel Aviv and Herzliya Pituah with a purpose to place there taping equipment.
During the Cold war penetration by various ways and means into a building of foreign embassy (mainly with the purpose of placing there taping devices and "bugs") was considered a usual practice of special services both of the communistic and western countries. Israeli SHABAK was not an exception. And there is no reason to assume that after the collapse of the USSR, the Israel's General Security Service stopped to use classical methods of counterespionage art. By the way in the past there were cases when the special equipment was placed in foreign diplomatic missions under cover of a robber's breaking in.
To tell the truth, other sources of AIA, which are familiar with specificity of the Israeli special services' activities, doubt that gangster's attacks on the residences of the ambassadors actually serve as covering for counterespionage operations. Their skepticism has several reasons. First, there is no practical necessity to place special equipment, for example, in the residence of the ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, the Israeli secret services today are much more constrained in their actions than couple decades back. The head of SHABAK would hardly dare to authorize such operation, because of the fears that in a case of a failure a diplomatic scandal may be provoked (that would inevitably add some trumps to his opponents in another competing special services). Besides, the Israeli counterespionage's financial bas is to low and human resources are to short to supervise so densely all the embassies of the CIS and the East European countries without exception. At the same time, the same sources, with various minor reservations, do not exclude that individual intrusions of "robbers on service" to a residence of this or that ambassador, under some circumstances could have happened recently...
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