Russian version
The outcome of elections in Kyrgyzstan not only has a decisive significance for the future of this country, but it also is an important event in the Great Game for influence in the whole of Central Asia. In view of the new President's past and views, it is not difficult to foresee the strengthening of Moscow's position in this region. Moreover, the change of power in Kyrgyzstan in March through July constituted a major step in Russia's gaining ground in the South. At the same time, riots in the East of Uzbekistan erupted, giving a push to military and political rapprochement between Tashkent and Moscow during May and June). As a result of a written agreement between presidents Vladimir Putin and Islam Karimov,
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| Islam Karimov and Vladimir Putin (Uzbek official sources) |
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Russia could now deploy large numbers of military troops in Uzbekistan. Simultaneously, in neighboring Tajikistan, two ministers of Defense signed documents creating a long-term legal basis for Russian military presence in this republic. By autumn, the number of Russian troops there will increase to 8.5 thousand. Against this background, the contacts became more frequent between President Putin and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev. During the period between April and July they met five times. As a consequence, Kazakhstan's economic attachment to Russia has grown to a considerable extent. At the same time, Russian companies increased their participation in energy projects in Turkmenistan, after being personally blessed by President Niyazov in April and May.
After having been defeated in the European part of the former Soviet Union, the Kremlin is rapidly intensifying its expansion to the Asian direction. The strengthening cooperation between Russia and Turkey, as well as the expected activization of Iran's regional policy, endanger the West's interests in Central Asia and in the Caspian region.
The Asian Bridgehead
In this multi-move combination, the change of power in Kyrgyzstan has particular significance. This can be explained by the extremely important strategic location of the Republic. It is situated in the very center of Central Asia.
Northern Kyrgyzstan is adjacent to a mountain massif that rises above Alma-Ata. The latter is the former capital of Kazakhstan, and it is still the economic and administrative center of this country. Eastern Kyrgyzstan is a gateway to Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang). It is in the regions close to Kyrgyzstan that the ideas of Uygur separatism are still alive, nourished by the influences of Islamic fundamentalism.
Southern Kyrgyzstan can serve a foothold for intelligence activities and military operations on the Afghani and the Pakistani fronts. Moreover, this area of the republic is part of the Ferghana Valley, which is divided among three states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Ferghana Valley is densely populated, economically backward, ethnically varicolored, and traditionally influenced by Islam, including radical forms of Islam. The Valley therefore shapes a single socio-political unit. Any change in one of the three parts of the Ferghana Valley will have an immediate impact on the other two. As a result, the solid position of any foreign state in Southern Kyrgyzstan allows it to influence the situation in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
The Double Trap
Russia gained all the geopolitical dividends from the change of power in the Republic, after Kurmanbek Bakiev won the elections. The new president is, first of all, Kremlin-oriented.
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| Kurmanbek Bakiev and Vladimir Putin (personal website of the Kyrgyz president) |
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This can be concluded not only from his own statements, but also from the frequency and timing of his visits to Moscow on the eve of, and after, the March coup d'etat. As a consequence, Kyrgyzstan is about to become a foothold for Russia's economic, military, and political expansion in the Central Asia.
The USA is in losing position. Bakiev and his minister of Foreign Affairs, Otumbaeva, have on several occasions emphasized that the American military presence in the Republic is only temporary. The situation is aggravated by the fact that Washington did not mention the trap that was set so skillfully for it under the cover of the May riots in the Ferghana Valley. Before that, the White House quite effectively conducted a critical dialogue with Tashkent, while preserving a strategic partnership with it. After the Andijan events, instead of continuing the same tactics,perhaps in a tougher,though unpublicized form, Washington chose a public confrontation with Tashkent. As a consequence, not only did the United States lose its only ally in Central Asia, but actually pushed it into Russia's embrace.
The Kyrgyz policy of the United States has been purblind to the same extent. "Velvet revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine gave the White House the erroneous impression that any oppositionist activity in the countries of the CIS is of a pro-Western nature. Since the end of 2004, Washington has viewed situation in Kyrgyzstan in this light... Such an erroneous approach was then encouraged by former President Askar Akayev, as well as by his adversaries.
Akayev enjoyed frightening Russian journalists with alleged clandestine links between the opposition and Western agents and secret services. This way, the friend of the first Russian president, who had received his education in the native city of the second Russian president, covertly tried to blackmail the Kremlin. Akayev maintains that if Moscow does not take measures to preserve its power, Kyrgyzstan will be "occupied" by the Americans. He was mistaken, being trapped in the patterns of Yeltsin's epoch, and having no idea of who his successor, Vladimir Putin, really is. The Kremlin was better informed about the situation in Kyrgyzstan than Akayev himself. Opposition leaders silently coordinated their actions with Moscow, while outwardly, through the media, strengthening rumors about their pro-Western orientation. This allowed them to use financial aid from different Western foundations and organizations. Just as, with Western money, the friend of the first Russian president was replaced by the confidant of the second Russian president, so it is no wonder that Bakiev's first statement after winning the election emphasized the need to curtail American presence in the area.
The Other Winners
In the first weeks after the March revolution in Kyrgyzstan, China was quite watchful concerning the events in the neighboring republic. There are many reasons for that, both of a local, and of a geopolitical character.
Beijing was rather pleased with the former president of Kyrgyzstan. At the end of the Nineties, with Akayev's consent, Chinese special services became active in the Republic, first of all against the local Uygur underground. In 2002 Akayev satisfied the territorial claims of its eastern neighbor, and gave up 900 thousand hectares of the Kyrgyz soil. During the last years of Akayev's regime, Beijing has become one of the main investors in the economy of the Republic. Two months prior to the revolution the sides had agreed upon the investment by China of $900 million in several large projects in Kyrgyzstan.
As for local opposition forces, Beijing traditionally was rather cautious about them, observing their actions more than intently. In fact many of the leaders of the opposition headed the movement protesting the Kyrgyz territorial concessions to China in 2002, which had been promoted by Akayev. By the way, this protest movement inspired active opposition to the authority of the government. This circumstance was supplemented by data from Chinese special services, based on appeals by Akayev's opponents to reconsider the agreement with Beijing, and on their contacts with Uygur underground activists. The fears caused by this information became amplified after the events of March 24. Particularly because the supporters of the opposition, who came to Bishkek from the southern region of the country, organized the destruction of facilities and establishments belonging to Chinese businessmen. According to the evaluations of those who suffered these losses, the level of damage was huge, reaching a total sum of $7 million.
The negative attitude of the Chinese leadership toward the Kyrgyz opposition has also geopolitical reasons. First, Beijing feared, that the change of regime in the neighboring republic would lead to the strengthening of the American position in the "western underbelly" of China, this in addition to already existing American military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Second, according to Chinese special services, any change in the political situation in Kyrgyzstan (including democratization, increase in interethnic intensity, islamization of the southern region), could affect the situation in Xinjiang, especially in its southern and southwestern sections.
Bakiev and his coterie tried quickly to dispel the fears of Beijing. The Chinese businessmen, who had suffered from attacks on their establishments, received compensation. Representatives of the new regime declared several times that they would not reconsider the agreement with Beijing. As a consequence, up to the middle of April the attitude of the Chinese to the new of leaders of Bishkek began to change. In May the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan visited China. The meeting of the leaders of two countries took place in July in the Kazakh capital.
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New Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiev and the Chinese president Hu Jintao (personal website of the Kyrgyz president) |
The new Kyrgyz leaders showed unequivocally that would not aggravate relations with China, but continued to be extremely interested in their activization. In May the countries agreed upon Chinese investment of CHY 10 million ($1,2 million) in the Kyrgyz economy. Simultaneously, information on the possible accommodation of a Chinese military contingent in Kyrgyzstan popped up. It becomes clear that Beijing has lost nothing by the overthrow of Akayev, but actually had gained much in the long run. Weakening of the US position in the region fully falls in with Chinese strategic interests. Besides, the new condition lessened the number of obstacles to further Chinese economic and demographic expansion to the west.
Turkey sent its Minister for Foreign Affairs to Kyrgyzstan, hardly more than month after the overthrow of President Akayev. Abdulla Gul became the first foreign visitor of such rank who visited Bishkek after the revolution. Thus, Ankara showed, that was always ready to support the brotherly Turkic states of Central Asia, caring little about their ruling regimes. Besides, Gul tried to create optimum conditions for the preservation and strengthening of the Turkish business position in the Kyrgyz market. Turkey is one of the main investors there. Thus, Ankara took steps to outrun its main economic competitors, China, Russia, and Iran, in this republic.
The first contacts between the new Kyrgyz leaders and Turkish businessmen took place in the middle of April. The question of compensation for those who suffered from the pogroms of March 24 was discussed. After Gul's visit mutual relations in the sphere of business became appreciably more active. On May 11, in Istanbul, a conference on the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan took place. The main attention during the event was given to the prospects of further investment of Turkish capital in Kyrgyzstan . A week later the acting vice-premier of the Kyrgyz republic, Daniar Usenov, invited one of the largest Turkish investors in Kyrgyzstan, Ahmet Kush, to a meeting in the House of the Government.
The contacts between Ankara and Bishkek in the area of security also tightened. Less than a month after the revolution, Turkey declared an allocation of military assistance to Kyrgyzstan totaling over $870 thousand. In 2004 Ankara allocated $2 million for the same purpose. The chief of the Turkish police academy, Tujai Yilmaz, visited Bishkek in May. He told about the plans of his department to render assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan. In both cases Ankara showed that the change of authority in the republic would not affect in any way their cooperation security matters (the military, special services, the Ministries of Internal Affairs. This cooperation has been developing successfully since 1992, and serves to promote Turkey's influence in Central Asia, and also increase the activity of its special services in this region.
Summing up, the active involvement of the Ankara's representatives in Kyrgyzstan, which started right after the revolution, has given them a real chance to widen and strengthen their positions in this country. Though Turkey and Russia are economic competitors in the local market, their strategic interests coincide, particularly on the issue of American presence in the region.
Iran initially reacted to the overthrow of the President of Kyrgyzstan as China did, very watchfully. In an official statement the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic noted, "For the last years Tehran applied much effort to strengthen relations with the government of Akayev."
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| Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Kamal Kharrazi and the former Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev (official website of the Iranian Foreign Ministry) |
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In the spring of 2002, for the first time in history, the head of the Iranian state at that time, President Khatami, visited Bishkek. His Kyrgiz colleague paid a reciprocal visit to Teheran at the end of 2003. Just in the last year Bishkek was visited by the first Vice-President of Iran, Minister of trade (twice,) the Minister of Health and the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. In September a meeting of the leaders of both countries took place at the Tajik capital. Though the Iranian presence in the Kyrgyz market is much smaller than the Chinese or Turkish, the Islamic Republic, during the Akayev's rule, became one of the main economic partners of Kyrgyzstan. In 2002 Teheran allocated a $1 million investment grant to this country. In 2003 Iran announced plans to invest $10 million dollars more in the economy of Kyrgyzstan in various forms of investment. At the beginning of 2005 Teheran allocated $60 million for promotion of its domestic business on the Kyrgyz market. In parallel Iranian companies participated in the realization of several large, even strategic, projects in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. One example of this, construction of a road connecting Bishkek with the main cities in the south of the country; Osh and further up to Kashgar in Chinese Xinjiang.
The policy of Tehran concerning Kyrgyzstan was part of the global Iranian strategy in Central Asia. This strategy is aimed at the neutralization of US efforts to accomplish the economic and political isolation of Iran in its region. In addition, Tehran aspires to become one of the key external economic partners of the countries of region, and also to strengthen its position in areas traditionally included in the zone of Iranian influence, namely, Tajikistan, Western and Northeast Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan.
The leaders of the Islamic Republic greatly feared that revolution in Kyrgyzstan would cause changes of regimes in Central Asia under the aegis of the USA. At first, Tehran had no doubts that Washington was behind the overthrow of Akayev. However, as was the case with China, the new leaders of Bishkek have hastened to dispel Iranian suspicions. In April and May, 2005, a number of representatives of the new authority met the ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Kyrgyzstan, Gholam-Reza Baheri Moghaddam. At the beginning of July, Bakiev had a long conversation with Mohammad Reza Aref, the first Vice-President of Iran in the Kazakh capital. Bakiev's statement on the necessity of curtailing the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan, were met in Teheran with undisguised delight. The Iranian leaders finally realized that in f of the new president of Kyrgyz republic they had found not an opponent, but a valuable strategic ally.
In the near future an increase in economic and political contacts between the two countries is expected. It will be only part of preplanned activization by Tehran in Central Asia. Thus, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will take advantage of the weakening of the US position in the region in order to strengthen the Iranian position…
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Third Russian Conquest of the Central Asia (part I)
Third Russian Conquest of the Central Asia (part II)
Russia - Turkey: The New Eurasian Alliance
Russia and Turkey Acting in Central Asia and in the Caucasus
Putin's Tehran Envoy Secrets
Russia Won the Elections in Iran
Iran
Iran to Deliver a Missile Blow to Azerbaijan
Iran Can Blow Up Azerbaijan From Within
Turkey
Ankara Outrun Players in Central Asia
Turkey is Ready to Help Uzbekistan
Will Turkish Soldiers Fight in Afghanistan?
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan: Islamic Rebels Appeal for Putin's Help
Uzbekistan Starts Official Investigation
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Kyrgyzstan
The Battle for Kyrgyzia – The Kremlin is Leading 1:0
Bishkek Has Sent to Moscow the Person from the Past
Karasu: Kyrgyzstan's Smoldering Wick
Tajikistan
Secrets of Tajik Army Go Public
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